
How to read treatment gaps, prior complaints and post-retention care in a slip-and-fall file.

In a slip-and-fall file there is no crash report and no vehicle damage, so the medical records are often the only contemporaneous account of how the injury happened. This guide shows a general liability adjuster how to read treatment gaps, prior complaints about the same body part, and care that began after the attorney was retained.
A general liability adjuster handling a slip-and-fall has less independent evidence than an auto adjuster has on day one. There is no police crash report. There is no vehicle damage to compare against the claimed forces. There is often no employer investigation, because the claimant was a customer, not a worker.
What there is: an incident report written by a store manager, sometimes a few seconds of camera footage, and the medical records.
That imbalance changes how the file gets decided. In an auto claim, the medical records mostly answer the damages question. In a premises claim, those same records are often the only contemporaneous account of the event. They record how the injury happened, what the claimant said hurt, and when.
Premises liability splits into two questions that do not share evidence.
The first is notice. Florida is a useful example. A claimant who slips on a transitory foreign substance in a business establishment must prove actual or constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition. Constructive knowledge can be shown circumstantially. Either the condition existed long enough that ordinary care would have caught it, or it occurred with regularity and was therefore foreseeable.
That question is answered by floor-sweep logs, camera footage, footprints in the liquid and employee testimony. None of it sits in the medical file.
The second question is causation. Did this fall produce this injury, and how much of it? That question is answered almost entirely by the medical file.
Adjusters sometimes work the notice question hard, then accept the medical narrative as given. The two deserve equal weight. A strong notice defense and a weak causation position still end in a large number.
Every treatment note opens with a history. The claimant, or someone speaking for them, describes what happened. That paragraph is written before counsel is involved and before a theory of the case exists. It is usually written within hours or days of the fall.
Read it as mechanism evidence, not background.
Compare it against the incident report on four points:
A body part that first appears six weeks in, with no mention in the triage note, is not automatically unrelated. But it needs an explanation. The explanation should be in the record rather than in the demand letter.
One caution before leaning hard on coded data. Injury mechanism is recorded more reliably in narrative than in codes.
A study compared trauma registry records against hospital discharge data for the same patients. Broad mechanism categories agreed in 84.7% of records, with a kappa of 0.762. At the level of the specific external-cause code, agreement fell sharply. Only 39.3% of discharge records carried the same E code as the registry record.
The practical lesson is to read the narrative history, not the code list. Coded data is useful for finding records. It is not reliable enough to carry a causation argument on its own.
"Gap in treatment" gets used as though it means one thing. It does not. Separate it into three. Each supports a different argument, and each has a different innocent explanation.
A short delay proves very little. Pain from a soft-tissue injury often builds over the following day or two. A customer who falls in a store may go home first and see a doctor once the stiffness sets in. Treating a one- or two-day delay as evidence against causation invites an easy rebuttal.
A longer delay is worth documenting. But the useful question is not how long. It is what the claimant did instead. Did they finish their shopping? Return to work? Take a flight? Those facts come from outside the medical file, and they cost the claimant more than a delay by itself.
This is the more useful one, and it is the one most often missed.
A claimant treats for four weeks, stops for three months, then resumes with a new provider and a heavier treatment plan. The stop is a documented statement about symptom level. People in pain do not usually stop treating.
Look for what sits at the edges of the gap:
When treatment resumes within days of the representation letter, the timing is a fact in the file. It is not proof of anything by itself. Adjusters who treat it that way tend to overreach, because claimants often seek counsel precisely when symptoms are not resolving.
What the timing does is shift the burden of explanation. The record should show a clinical reason for the resumption. A new symptom, a failed conservative course, or a referral driven by a finding all qualify. If the only thing that changed was the representation, that is a point for the negotiation, not a defense on its own.
Nearly every adult over forty has a treatment history. The question is never whether a prior complaint exists. It is whether the prior complaint involved the same structure, and whether it was symptomatic at the time of the fall.
Prior treatment for the same body part rarely appears under the current diagnosis. A claimant now treating for a lumbar disc herniation may have a history filed as:
None of those search cleanly. They sit in different records, under different provider names, sometimes in different states. They share no common vocabulary. This is why a prior-complaint review built on keyword search of the current file usually finds nothing.
A documented prior condition does not end the causation argument. Under the eggshell-plaintiff principle, a defendant generally takes the claimant as found. Aggravation of a pre-existing condition is commonly compensable. The rule and its limits vary by state, so check the governing law before pricing the file.
The prior complaint is only useful if the file can answer the next question: what changed.
That means establishing the pre-fall baseline. Was the claimant working, treating, medicated, restricted? A condition that was quiet for six years and required surgery six weeks after the fall supports the claimant. A condition under active treatment the week before supports the carrier. The record distinguishes them, but only if someone builds the timeline. The same discipline drives pre-existing condition recognition in medical records across every injury line.
This is where general liability files diverge most sharply from workers' compensation. There is no panel physician, no directed care and no fee schedule. The claimant's treatment path is unconstrained. After representation, it is frequently funded by a letter of protection.
A letter of protection defers collection until the case resolves. Florida now defines it broadly. The definition covers any arrangement by which a provider treats in exchange for a promise of payment from a judgment or settlement. The label on the document does not matter.
More usefully for an adjuster, the same statute makes disclosure a condition precedent to claiming those expenses. The claimant must produce four things:
The statute also addresses referrals. Where an attorney referred the claimant to a provider, evidence of that referral is admissible notwithstanding the attorney-client privilege statute. The financial relationship between the firm and the provider is relevant to the testifying provider's bias.
Those provisions are Florida-specific. Other states handle letters of protection very differently. The underlying questions travel: who referred the claimant, who is being paid, how much, and whether the claimant had coverage they did not use.
Treatment under a letter of protection is often billed at full charge, because no payer has negotiated it down. That inflates the specials in the demand package, and the multiplier applied to them.
Several states have closed that gap. Texas limits recovery of medical expenses to the amount actually paid or incurred. In Haygood v. De Escabedo, 356 S.W.3d 390 (Tex. 2011), the Texas Supreme Court held that only evidence of recoverable expenses is admissible. Charges the provider has no legal right to be paid are excluded. Florida's statute similarly limits evidence of satisfied past medical expenses to amounts actually paid.
For evaluation purposes, the billed total in the demand is a starting figure, not a value. The itemized, coded billing the statute requires is what lets an adjuster rebuild the number.
Premises files carry real volume. CDC data shows roughly 4.5 million emergency department visits each year from falls among older adults alone. About 1.4 million of those end in hospitalization. Most never become claims. The ones that do arrive with hundreds of pages of records that must be read against each other, not in sequence.
A practical order of work on a represented premises file:
None of this is new practice. The obstacle is time. A 300-page record set with three providers, two gaps and a prior chiropractic history takes hours to read properly. A liability adjuster carrying a full caseload does not reliably get those hours on every file.
That is the gap claims teams handling general liability files are trying to close. Some use nurse review, some use structured chronologies, and some use bodily injury claim file analysis that links every finding back to its source page. The method matters less than the discipline behind it.
The causation answer is usually already in the records. It is rarely on one page.